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Introduction
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, two sets of phenomena are 
challenging our understanding of democracy and democratization. First,
transition from authoritarian regimes into some form of democracy is no
longer understood to constitute the most prevalent or important change in
worldwide democratization processes. Second, contemporary processes of
domestic political change are unfolding within a radically transformed inter-
national environment compared to even two decades ago (Gershman 2005;
Whitehead 2004).
As the Freedom House organization has been underlining in its reports over
the last decade,1 etc. the stable, closed authoritarian regime has become
something of a rarity. While in 1974 – the year that heralded the launch of
the “third wave” of global democratization with the Portuguese Revolução dos
Cravos (Huntington 1991) – the number of democracies on the planet stood
at a mere 39, at the end of 2006, out of 193 independent countries, 
123 ranked as electoral democracies (Freedom House 2006). Thus, for the
first time in human history, democracy had become not only a universal 
aspiration, but the predominant form of government in the world, and the
only form enjoying broad international legitimacy (McFaul 2004; Gershman
2005; Sen 1999). The triumph of democracy, moreover, has (so far at least)
proven steadier than many would have expected, with cases of outright 
breakdowns and reversions to autocracy, and fears of a “reverse wave” to
autocracy, largely held at bay (Diamond 2000; 2005).
Yet a serious reservation is attached to this seemingly sanguine story. For
as overtly authoritarian regimes have disappeared from many parts of the
world, they have typically been replaced – particularly since the end of the
Cold War – not by high-quality, liberal democracies, but by hybrid regimes
that combine democratic and authoritarian elements. Sandwiched on a
continuum between liberal democracy, on the one side, and closed authoritar-
ian regimes, on the other side, these “grey zone” entities (Carothers 2002) –
which today (2006) number as many as 58 countries, roughly a third of the
world’s total – represent both the new frontiers of democratization theory and
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a novel challenge for local and international reformists concerned to promote
the consolidation of free and effective government in transitional countries. The
uncomfortable co-existence in so many countries around the world of, on the
one hand, formally democratic procedures and, on the other hand, abuse of
fundamental civil and political rights, high levels of criminality and violence,
endemic corruption, and floundering socioeconomic structures, in other
words, is beginning to motivate scholars to consider explicitly the substan-
tive, non-electoral dimensions of democracy. Indeed, some of the most salient
contemporary questions for students of democratization, development and
international affairs – whether academics, aid practitioners or policy-makers
– no longer have to do with electoral breakthroughs, or the consolidation of
the bare procedural rules necessary for the existence of electoral democracy.
Rather, the new questions are focused on the content of democratic govern-
ment, understanding the nature of hybrid regimes, the dynamics of their
endurance or change and, from a more practical perspective, the conditions
and dynamics that could encourage the transformation of hybrid regimes 
into substantive democracies of reasonably high quality (Diamond and
Morlino 2005).
These new questions in democratization studies, moreover, are today
addressed against an international backdrop radically different from the ones
that guided the transitologists of the 1970s and 1980s and, to a lesser degree,
the consolidationists of the 1990s. Indeed, in the hindsight of two decades at
most, our analytical models of democratization have been challenged not only
by the proliferation of hybrid regimes – a phenomenon that highlights the
absurdity of conceptualizing democratization as a short, unidirectional inter-
val between two clearly defined, stable regime types – but by a radically
transformed international environment, and a parallel recognition of the
importance of the international dimensions of democratization (Pridham
1991; Whitehead 1996a; Burnell and Calvert 2005).
Twenty years ago democratic transitions were relatively infrequent, bipo-
larity discouraged the risk of instability inherent in democratic experimenta-
tion, and the notion that steady authoritarian rule helped to foster the
conditions of stability necessary for economic modernization still carried a
substantial following (Whitehead 2004). The end of the Cold War not only
expanded democratic practices into the former Communist world, it also
eliminated a chief rationale for tolerating autocracies in the non-Communist
one, as the withdrawal of western support for Apartheid South Africa demon-
strated. With the number of new democracies growing rapidly in the 1980s
and 1990s, democratization not only began to be perceived as the interna-
tional norm rather than the exception, it also precipitated an unprecedented
surge in democracy promotion activity by the main western powers (Smith
1994; Carothers 1999; Youngs 2004). At the hard edge of the spectrum of
intervention – in countries from Haiti to Sierra Leone, from Bosnia-
Herzegovina to East Timor and Afghanistan – weakening norms of state sover-
eignty, coupled with the growing linkage made by the United States (US) in
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particular between freedom and security, have led to the proliferation of the
use of military force and the establishment of new forms of international
trusteeship to remove authoritarian rulers and install democratically elected and
run governments, even under the most difficult post-conflict conditions. The
deployment of non-coercive mechanisms to protect and promote democracy has
also exploded over the same period. World Bank figures indicate a tenfold
increase in international democracy promotion expenditure between 1991 and
2000 – an annual increase of approximately US$3 billion (World Bank 2004).
Institution building for democratic governance now accounts for 40 to 45
percent of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) worldwide
budget (Dervis 2006), and more regional organizations, NGOs and transna-
tional networks now wield more resources than ever before in order to protect
and promote good governance and democracy through sanctions 
and positive incentives, socialization techniques, monitoring and reporting
(Slaughter 2005; Russett and Oneal 2001).
Not surprisingly, contemporary democratization scholarship displays a
growing interest in both western democracy promotion policies and the
international dimensions of democratization more broadly (Burnell 2005;
Levitsky and Way 2005; Pevehouse 2005; Carothers 2004; Youngs 2004).
Still, critical questions of theory, conceptualization and measurement abound
in the field. Do international factors, including the democracy promotion
policies of western actors, play a significant role in encouraging or discourag-
ing democratic development in domestic systems? If so, when and how do
different strategies – external incentives, financial and technical aid, social-
ization techniques, diplomacy or demonstration effects – influence domestic
decision-makers to improve freedom, democratic accountability, equality and
responsiveness? How can the influence of external actors be conceptualized
and evaluated? What combination of domestic conditions and foreign ‘inter-
ventions’ is most likely to lead to the transformation of illiberal, ineffective
and corrupt procedural democracies into freer, fairer and better governed
democracies? What are the pathways of external influence on domestic
change, and what does the nexus of interaction between external and domes-
tic variables look like in reality?
This volume approaches these complex questions using new theoretical
insights and empirical data. To engage with the themes outlined above in a
conceptually and methodologically informed manner, we trace the dynamics
of change in a central dimension of liberal, substantive democracy – the rule of
law – and on the interaction between external and domestic structures, agents
and processes shaping such change. In order to get as near as is possible in
social science to tracing causal links between domestic and external factors,
we consciously focus on the interaction between a defined international 
actor that seeks to promote rule of law reforms in third countries, the
European Union (EU), and four countries with a different, yet comparable,
history of structured interactions with the EU and basic domestic political
transformations – Romania, Turkey, Serbia and Ukraine – in the period since
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the end of the Cold War (see below). Empirically, the volume presents the results
of original research on the influence of externally driven rule of law promotion
strategies in a group of subject countries where: (1) the strategies deployed
emanate from the same external actor; (2) similar reform goals are sought; but
(3) the strategies differ substantially in key features – the force of conditionality,
opportunities for elite socialization and immediacy of incentives for compliance.
Thus, we supersede the existing literature on EU influence on candidate countries
(Kelley 2004a; Linden 2002, Pridham 2005; Sadurski, Czarnota and Krygier
2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a; Vachudova 2005), going
‘beyond enlargement’ to compare membership with non-membership EU
strategies. In doing so, we seek to unpack the still poorly conceptualized and
poorly understood notion of external influence on domestic democratic reform
processes; to ascertain where and to what extent, if at all, such influence has in
fact occurred; to ascertain under what conditions external influence is more
likely, and with what consequences for democratic quality in the case study
countries. By asking these questions vis-à-vis four examples of ‘hard cases’
targeted by the EU for transformative engagement (Youngs 2005), we seek to
derive lessons of broader application for scholars (of democratic development,
comparative politics, international relations theory and international legal
studies), as well as practitioners (in national aid agencies, NGOs, security and
multilateral development organizations).
The remainder of this chapter addresses the notion of hybrid regimes,
drawing on O’Donnell’s insight that a major factor missing from flawed
democracies is the “democratic Rule-of-Law” (O’Donnell 1998; 2005).
Having laid these conceptual foundations, we identify the gaps in existing
analyses of external influence on democratic development in national systems,
explain our focus on the EU as a rule of law promotion entity, and justify our
case study selection. Chapter 2 of this volume then sets out in greater detail
the analytical framework uniting this collaborative, comparative study.
Hybrid regimes: definition and challenges
That the distinction between non-democracy and democracy could be concep-
tualized in terms of gradations, rather than as a dichotomy, and that in reality
there always existed a gray area between non-democratic stable regimes of
different sorts (see e.g. Linz 2000, and Brooker 2000) and consolidated, liberal
democracy, was already evident to political comparativists in the late 1960s
(Finer 1970; Dahl 1971) and later (Collier and Adcock 1999). The magnitude
and spectrum of that gray area, however, have both greatly expanded since the
advent of the “third wave” of democratization in 1974 (Huntington 1991). 
At that time democracies were few, but they were largely liberal democracies –
characterized not only by free, fair and competitive elections, but by protection
of civil and political freedoms, a reasonable degree of accountability and respon-
siveness to citizen needs, and the rule of law. Democracies were concentrated in
western Europe, North America and a number of their former colonies; they
9780415451024-Ch01  4/16/08  7:00 PM  Page 4
Hybrid regimes 5
were a clear minority, but they were nearly all “good democracies” (Morlino
2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005).
One of the most striking characteristics of the third wave, particularly in
its late period in the 1990s, has been the unprecedented growth in the
number of hybrid regimes: political regimes that adopt the form of electoral
democracy (with regular, seemingly or actually competitive, elections), but
fail to fulfill the substantive content of consolidated, liberal democracy, or do
so only ambiguously (Karl 1995; Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002).
As Diamond (2002) observes, the term ‘hybrid regime’ is itself a generic 
category containing at least four distinct subtypes of regimes. The category
of non-democratic regimes that contain some form of electoral competition 
can itself be divided into competitive (variously described as “competitive
authoritarian” or “electoral authoritarian”) or uncompetitive (“hegemonic
authoritarianism”) (Diamond 2002; Schedler 2006). This leaves electoral 
(illiberal or minimal) democracy as a third subtype of diminished forms of
democracy, and a residual category of “ambiguous regimes” positioned on the
fuzzy border between electoral authoritarian and electoral democracy.
Whereas recent scholarship has focused primarily on conceptualizing and
explaining the proliferation of electoral authoritarianism (Brownlee 2007;
Schedler 2006), we are chiefly concerned with the latter two subtypes of hybrid
regimes. Clearly, these partial democracies are morally and practically perni-
cious. They give democracy a bad name by failing to deliver on people’s legiti-
mate expectations for effective participatory government, blur the distinction
between genuinely free societies and authoritarianism, and help bad rulers endure
in power by semi-legitimizing them. Their democratic content is at best weak,
and at worst they display serious problems of corruption, inequality, abuse of
civic and political freedoms, and state ineffectiveness. But it is the sheer rapid-
ity and scale of their proliferation that has brought the problem of hybrid
regimes to the forefront of policy and academic attention:
While the ‘transitologists’ of the 1970s and 1980s investigated the
conditions and modes of transition from dictatorship to democracy, the
‘consolidologists’ of the 1990s concentrated on inquiring into causes,
conditions and models of the consolidation of young democracies. Most
recently, the questions of whether democracy is working, how ‘good’ or
‘bad’ a democracy is, and of the conceptual issue of diminished sub-types
of democracy (illiberal democracies, defective democracies and so on)
have begun to become the new predominant trend in democracy theory
and democratization studies.
(Merkel and Croissant 2004, 1).
If we now know what hybrid regimes are, and how widespread they have
become, the next question is: what determines whether such regimes evolve
into fuller, higher quality democracies, remain stuck in a gray zone of 
illiberal, minimal electoralism, or backslide into outright authoritarianism?
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What, in other words, is the “democratic substance” missing from what has
been variously referred to as “democracy with adjectives” (Collier and
Levitsky 1997) - “illiberal” (Zakaria 1997), “delegative” (O’Donnell 1994),
“clientelist” (Kitschelt 2000), or simply “pseudo” (Diamond 2002) democ-
racy? What accounts for the emergence, retardation or wilting of such
substance? And finally, from a democracy promotion point of view, what
action can and should be taken by domestic and external reformists to best
encourage transitions from hybrid regimes to substantive, higher quality
democracy?
In approaching these questions we encounter a gap in knowledge that we
hope, at least in part, to fill in this volume. As Epstein et al. assert:
[Partial democracies] account for an increasing portion of current regimes
and the lion’s share of regime transitions ... [but] ... we have little infor-
mation as to the factors that would lead partial democracies to either
slide down to autocracy or move up to full democracy ... the determi-
nants of the behavior of the partial democracies elude our understanding
... the factors affecting transitions out of partial democracy remain poorly
understood.
(Epstein et al. 2006, pp. 556 and 564–5).
To approach the double conundrum of understanding the dynamics of
change away from hybrid regimes, and the role that external actors may play
in such transformation, we first identify a key dimension of democratic
substance that is missing from hybrid regimes – the ‘democratic Rule-
of-Law’ – and then proceed to begin addressing the topic of international
influence on domestic democratic development.
Democratic substance and the rule of law
Transitions from hybrid regimes to more substantive, higher quality democ-
racy can be explored along several theoretical axes (Morlino 2003, Whitehead
2002). Impressed by the violence, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, inequality,
corruption and frequent violation of civil freedoms that characterize many
formally democratic states – in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the former
Soviet bloc – scholars have recently shifted the focal point of democratic
theory in an attempt to identify what is missing from such regimes. At the
same time, the growing interest of development economics over the last
decade in issues of public voice and accountability, political stability, govern-
ment effectiveness, the rule of law, regulatory quality and control of corrup-
tion (all under the notion of ‘good governance’, rather than the more overtly
political ‘democracy’) are also focusing new attention on the non-electoral
dimensions of democracy (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2006; Jomo and
Fine 2006; Drury, Krieckhaus and Lusztig 2006). The quest has led demo-
cratic theory to expand the discussion of democratic substance, or quality, and
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to critique older conceptualizations for confusing ‘real’ democracy with mere
electoralism (Karl 1995; O’Donnell 1998).
At a bare minimum democracy requires: sovereign elected institutions;
universal adult suffrage; free, competitive, fair and recurring elections; multi-
ple serious political parties and a plurality of sources of information (Dahl
1971; Schmitter and Karl 1993). The basic conditions for democracy, in other
words, involve institutionalized guarantees for participation in public contes-
tation for power. In contrast, when we approach the issue of democratic
substance – what makes a good democracy – we can identify eight dimen-
sions on which an empirical determination of quality can be made: (1) the
rule of law; (2) Participation (3) Competition; (4) Electoral Accountability;
(5) Inter-institutional Accountability; (6) Responsiveness to the needs, inter-
ests and expectations of citizens; (7) Freedom (consisting of political, civil and
socioeconomic rights); (8) Equality/solidarity (Diamond and Morlino 2005).
Prima inter pares among the dimensions of democratic quality is the rule of
law (O’Donnell 1998; Bratton and Chang 2006; Thier 2007). As Linz and
Stepan’s seminal work on democratic consolidation indicates, the degree to
which the rule of law exists in a given polity reflects the entire democratic 
quality of that regime (Linz and Stepan 1996). Indeed, the rule of law may be
understood as the foundation upon which every other dimension of democratic
quality ultimately rests (Diamond and Morlino 2005). Hence, the study of rule
of law reform dynamics reflects deeper and broader processes of domestic 
democratic development, and an inquiry into the influence of international
actors on changes in the quality of the rule of law moves the research agenda
beyond the procedural, macro-democracy nexus of inquiry of the lion’s share of
the democracy promotion literature.
Anyone concerned to uphold the ‘rule of law’ at home or to promote it
abroad, however, is confronted with an a priori challenge of conceptualizing
the term. Conceptualization involves the identification of the attributes 
that are constitutive of the concept under consideration. Such definition is a
critical task, since the specification of the meaning of the concept forms the
epicenter around which all subsequent decisions regarding theory, data
collection and analysis are taken. Accordingly, the attributes that are consti-
tutive of the concept under consideration have to be defined carefully, which
means neither minimally nor with such overburdened detail as to make the
concept synonymous with “all things bright and beautiful”, thus rendering it
of little analytical use.2
Yet, to a degree perhaps unparalleled in social science phraseology, the term
‘rule of law’ is vulnerable to overreaching and abuse. More so than the term
‘democracy’ even – which itself has gained hegemonic international endorse-
ment – the ideal of the rule of law is advocated nearly universally and, just as
importantly, never seriously rejected. Amidst a host of deep cleavages –
between east and west, north and south, Islamic and non-Islamic, liberal and
non-liberal societies – as Tamanaha observes: “there appears to be widespread
agreement, traversing all fault lines, on one point, and one point alone: that
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the “rule of law” is good for everyone.” (Tamanaha 2004, 1). Notwithstanding
its pervasiveness as an ideal, however, the term is afflicted by an extraordi-
nary divergence of understandings. Often, it seems “there are almost as 
many conceptions of the rule of law as there are people defending it.” (Taiwo
1999, 152).
Does this mean, as some theorists would have it, that the concept of the
rule of law has been rendered meaningless by “ideological abuse and general
over-use”? (Shklar 1987, 1). We submit that it does not. But neither does it
mean that anything goes, and that any given definition is as good as another.
Rather, because conceptualization is both intimately connected with theory
and is a legitimately open-ended, evolving activity that is ultimately assessed
in terms of the usefulness of the theory it helps to formulate, scholars are at
liberty to determine what attributes must be included in a definition of the
rule of law, while observing the methodological sensibility of avoiding the
extremes of including too little, or too much, relative to their theoretical
goals (Kaplan 1964, 51–3).
Identifying the constitutive attributes of the rule of law represents a chal-
lenge, less so because of the term’s “essentially contested” nature than by
virtue of its evolving one, and the loose use made of it by practitioners and
scholars from different disciplines (Radin 1989).3 For Dicey, who coined and
popularized the phrase, the concept represented one of the two legs upon
which the constitutional order of England consistently rested since the
Norman Conquest of 1066 (Dicey 1908). For Neumann, a Weimar Republic
jurist and member of the Frankfurt School writing in the 1920s, it stood for
one of the two defining characteristics of the modern nation-state; the rule of
law being in perpetual, irreconcilable struggle with the modern state’s other
basic characteristic – sovereignty (Neumann 1986). Whereas in the middle
of the twentieth century Hayek (1944) perceived the rule of law as the essen-
tial safeguard against the totalitarian tendencies of state socialism, by the late
1980s Hayek’s disciples invoked the rule of law in their assault on Keynesian
economics and as part and parcel of their calls for the US and the International
Financial Institutions (IFIs) to pursue liberal market economy and develop-
ment policies.4
In contemporary use, as Kleinfeld (2006) observes, the phrase is commonly
brandished by politicians, practitioners and scholars to imply at least five
meanings that are in fact distinct, but seldom clearly differentiated by those
who invoke the term: (1) government bound by law; (2) equality before the
law; (3) law and order; (4) predictable, efficient justice, and (5) public power
respectful of fundamental rights. The definitional challenge is further
compounded by the deep disconnection between the different communities
now making use of the phrase, and the intellectual contexts from within
which they operate.
Taking a step back from this confusion, we can divide conceptions of the
rule of law into two broad types: thin and thick. This basic typology 
corresponds roughly to what Craig (1997) calls “formal” and “substantive”,
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Selznick (1999) “negative” and “positive”, and Dworkin (1985, 11–13) terms
“rule-book” versus “rights” conceptions of the rule of law.
Thin, formal, or negative conceptions of the rule of law demand the essen-
tial separation of law from politics (or “autonomous law”), and focus on the
minimal conditions necessary for law to restrict sheer arbitrariness in the
ruler’s use of power.5 Restraining, if not actually taming, Leviathan has been
the historically original context within which the concept of the rule of law
emerged. Hence for Dicey: “the rule of law is contrasted with every system of
government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary,
or discretionary powers of constraint”, so that no individual could be lawfully
punished by the state “except for a distinct breach of law established in the
ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land” (Dicey 1908,
188). Restraining discretionary use of power is similarly at the heart of
Hayek’s definition of the concept. “Stripped of all technicalities” as Hayek’s
powerful formulation puts it:
this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed 
and announced beforehand – rules which make it possible to foresee with
fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given
circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this
knowledge.
(Hayek 1944, 54).
Such a conception – sometimes dubbed “government by law, not by man”
– stems from the historic struggle to curb the coercive force of the strongest
in human society, and is thus chiefly concerned with the “negative” goal of
shackling coercive authority. The constitutive attributes of a thin conception,
therefore, stress formal or procedural aspects of the rule of law: laws must be
open and public so that they can act as a guide to people (there should be no
secret laws); the meaning of laws must be reasonably clear so that ordinary
people can be guided by them; laws should be relatively stable, so that people
can plan their lives by them; laws must be prospective, not retroactive; 
and the making of laws themselves must be governed by known, clear and
relatively stable rules.
In contrast, a thick, substantive or positive (though anti-positivist) concep-
tion of the rule of law, accepts all the constitutive attributes of the thin 
definition, but at the same time insists that the rule of law cannot be divorced
from fundamental elements of political morality and institutional practicality.
In a substantive conception, laws enshrine and protect political and civil
liberties, as well as procedural guarantees. It assumes that all those wielding
public power must themselves be embedded in a comprehensive legal frame-
work, so that individuals can enforce their rights against the state as a whole.
Since government itself is ruled by law, corruption and other forms of illegality
are prohibited. The requirement that rights should be actually defendable
means that the central institutions of the justice system, including lawyers,
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courts, the police and prosecution are at least reasonably fair, competent and
efficient. This assumes a reasonably effec-tive structure of state institutions,
wielding a degree of administrative capacity adequate to carrying out the
functions of the state. It further means that judges ought to be impartial and
independent of the remainder of the state apparatus – otherwise the ability 
of individuals to uphold their rights before them would be endangered by
political dependence and manipulation.
A substantive democracy, accordingly, is characterized by ‘democratic
Rule-of-Law’, which itself embodies five main dimensions: (1) protection of
civil freedoms and political rights; (2) independent judiciary and a modern
justice system; (3) institutional and administrative capacity to formulate,
implement and enforce the law; (4) effective fight against corruption, illegality
and abuse of power by state agencies; and (5) security forces that are respectful
of citizens rights and are under civilian control.6 These five dimensions,
accordingly, are our main indicators of changes in democratic quality.
Though the two concepts are not synonymous, the affinity between the
democratic rule of law and liberal democracy is clearly profound and multi-
dimensional. Even a minimal, electoral democracy cannot exist unless rulers
comply with at least one rule – that which regulates who should occupy the
position of ruler given the result of elections. More broadly, the virtues of the
rule of law are substantially the same as those of the democratic process, in
three key respects: the rule of law upholds the political rights of a democratic
regime; it protects the civil liberties and rights of the entire population
(including minority and other disadvantaged groups); and it establishes
“horizontal accountability” – networks of responsibility “which entail that all
public and private agents, including the highest state officials, are subject to
appropriate, legally established controls on the lawfulness of their acts”
(O’Donnell 2005, 7). Indeed, as Carothers suggests, properly conceived the
interrelation between the rule of law and liberal democracy goes beyond
democratic processes to permeate institutions and spheres across society:
The rule of law makes possible individual rights, which are at the core of
democracy. A government’s respect for the sovereign authority of the
people and a constitution depends on its acceptance of law. Democracy
includes institutions and processes that, although beyond the immediate
domain of the legal system, are rooted in it.
(Carothers 2006, 4–5).
At the turn of the twenty-first century, in sum, the rule of law is most
appropriately conceptualized not merely as a check on naked tyranny, an
elixir for sustainable economic growth, or a set of institutional attributes, but
as a key dimension (arguably the key dimension) of democratic quality. Such
a conception taps into advances in legal philosophy, development economics,
and democratic theory, in a manner that facilitates an analytically useful
understanding of the rule of law as democratic substance, and its development
as indicative of progress in democratic quality.
10 Amichai Magen and Leonardo Morlino
9780415451024-Ch01  4/16/08  7:00 PM  Page 10
External influence on domestic democratic development
From their inception in the late 1960s through to the immediate aftermath
of the Cold War, the predominant explanatory models of democratic develop-
ment perceived the process as essentially a domestic drama, took the individ-
ual nation-state as the unit of analysis, and largely screened out international
factors.7 Indeed, until the early to mid-1990s, the role of the international
context was correctly described as the “forgotten dimension” (Pridham 1991;
Burnell 2005) in the study of democratization. While some political compar-
ativists continue to examine processes of political, institutional and legal
reform at the national and sub-national levels in isolation from the broader
international environment (Elster, Ofee and Preuss. 1998; Geddes 1999),
since the end of the Cold War growing attention is being placed on the tasks
of identifying, conceptualizing and, most recently, evaluating the role of
external factors in domestic democratization processes. Along with rising
recognition of the role of international factors in democratic transitions 
and consolidation, moreover, we have been witnessing growing interest –
particularly in the US and Europe after the 11 September 2001 attacks – in
examining the deliberate promotion of democracy abroad (Burnell 2005;
Carothers 2004; Crawford 2003; Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi 2000;
Ottaway 2003; Youngs 2004; see also Fukuyama and McFaul 2007). Still, as
a five-year, joint American–European research project on the state of the art
regarding international democracy promotion concluded, although democracy
promotion has become an increasingly prominent feature of the foreign 
policies of leading western actors, the “international dimension of democracy
promotion nonetheless remains at best understudied and poorly understood”
(Schraeder 2003, 22). We identify four main gaps in knowledge, as follows.
First, the study of international democracy promotion necessitates piercing
the domestic–international membrane, opening up the ‘black box’ of the state
and developing both theoretical and empirical knowledge on external–internal
linkages of democratization. In practice however, for a variety of historical,
intellectual, methodological and institutional reasons, theories of comparative
politics, international relations, institutionalism and international law have
constructed largely separate, independent and self-contained spheres of inquiry,
with distinct actors and research questions. Just as political comparativists have
screened out international factors, international relations theorists concentrate
on international outcomes and have been insufficiently prepared to research
causal linkages between international agents and domestic actors.8 Researching
external dimensions of democratization, moreover, must involve the insights of
both academics and practitioners. Yet the separation between the two worlds
remains profound. In attempting to explain exogenous influences on domestic
political developments, academics have tended to gravitate towards history
(often going back several centuries) (Moore 1966; Tilly 1975, 1990; Greif
2005, 2006) rather than grapple with the messy history of the present. For their
part, practitioners borrow few insights from academics, and the two groups are
generally “engaged in dissimilar enterprises” (Carothers 1999, 94).
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Second, the existing literature on international democracy promotion tends
to be descriptive, focusing on the democracy promotion motives, strategies
and instruments (the “supply side”) of individual countries, primarily the US,
rather than attempting to get at the experience of countries targeted for
change or, even more so, the interaction between external actors and domestic
change processes.9 In reality, it is never the case that international factors
alone, whether a unitary actor or a host of them, play an independent causal
role in the development of democratization within a given domestic setting.
If until the mid-1990s international actors were screened out altogether, in
the more recent literature it appears that the pendulum has swung to the
opposite extreme, whereas what is required is more empirical knowledge
regarding when and how external actors have managed to promote internal
reforms, as well as far greater attention to understanding the interactions
between external and domestic factors.
Third, just as democracy promoters have tended to adopt a ‘one size fits all’
template to their work (Carothers 1999; Boerzel and Risse 2004), evaluators
of domestic democratic change tend implicitly to homogenize external 
influence on domestic reform processes. In reality, however, the same set of
independent variables (whether internal or external) may have a different
influence on democratization outcomes depending on the kind of outcome
being analyzed. The mix of independent variables that generate political
liberalization in an autocratic regime, for instance, may not be the same forces
that trigger a successful transition. Likewise, the factors that cause an 
electoral breakthrough may be of little relevance to the flow of democratic
content post-transition – the protection of political and civic rights, account-
ability, responsiveness and effective rule of law – necessary for high-quality,
liberal democracy. Countries trying to build democratic institutions after a
war or a collapse face a different set of challenges than democratizing regimes
with effective states. Since to date there has been little contiguity between
scholars of democratic transitions, consolidation and post-conflict state-
building, it is less surprising perhaps that we have not yet differentiated
between what are in reality radically different contexts and processes of
change, and the varying roles of external actors in each category. Historically,
scholarly and policy emphasis has gravitated towards dramatic events of 
transition from authoritarian rule and, more recently, post-conflict political
reconstruction efforts. By exploring the nature and limits of external influ-
ence on the quieter processes of shifts in the quality of democracy, we hope to
draw attention to the phenomenon of variety, where external factors play
different roles in different types of domestic political outcomes.
Indeed, our need to attend to the less visible, messier travails inherent in
efforts to improve democratic quality in imperfect democracies, is explained,
in part at least, by the intellectual history of democratization studies as a
field. Whereas the ‘transitologists’ of the 1980s (focusing on southern Europe
and Latin America as their case studies) saw democratization as a short 
interlude between one stable regime type and another - non-democracy to
12 Amichai Magen and Leonardo Morlino
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democracy – we have come to understand democratization as a more complex,
multilayered, long-term and open-ended process. Especially where the goal is
the eventual establishment of a high-quality democracy, democratization has
come to be understood as a multi-faceted, potentially reversible process 
lasting decades rather than years (Whitehead 2004). Accordingly, new
analytical models are required to conceptualize international actor influence
on regime development in the spheres spanning the aftermath of electoral
breakthrough, all the way to the entrenchment of high-quality democracy.
Instances of reversals, hurdles and even outright failure, must be included in
the analysis not only to avoid selection bias and to isolate the causal mecha-
nisms that were ultimately necessary for democratic change, but equally to
capture the ebbs and flows that characterize ongoing, often non-linear,
processes of democratic development.
Finally, the strong incentive for multilateral development banks, state aid
agencies and other donor organizations, is to document success stories, where
the wisdom of investment in aid for democracy can be showcased before
budget allocating legislatures and taxpayers reassured that democracy 
promotion ‘works’. This is partly a reflection of the political economy of the
growing post-Cold War, post-9/11 democracy promotion ‘industry’. Thus,
for example, a large cross-national quantitative report on the effects of US
foreign assistance on democracy promotion – compiled with the participation
of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and
published in 2006 – contends that US$10 million invested in USAID
democracy assistance between 1990 and 2003 produced, on average, a 
0.25 point improvement in the Freedom House score of the recipient state
(Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson 2006). Are these felicitous findings
matched by the experience of transitional countries struggling to improve the
quality of accountability, clean government, and protection of civil and polit-
ical rights? Does this aggregate level, quantitative report and others like it  –
which can tell us very little about causality or the pathways of connections
between external influence and domestic change processes – reflect the real-
ity of post-Cold War international actor influence on democratic develop-
ment? Or does the picture that emerges from a close qualitative examination
of external influence on domestic change suggest a different conclusion?
Chapter 2 in this volume sets out an analytical framework specifically
addressing these puzzles. But before that, we need to justify our focus on the
EU as an agent of rule of law promotion, and explain our case study selection.
Why the European union? Why these cases?
The EU is not the sole international actor currently engaged in the promotion
of rule of law reforms in developing and transitional countries (Carothers 2006;
Jensen and Heller 2003). Neither was it the first to have become involved in
this field of international activity. Indeed, although since the end of the
Second World War four main ‘waves’ of rule of law promotion movements
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have taken place – where leading western states have sought, either directly
or through multilateral development organizations, to promote legal and
judicial reforms in transitional countries – the EC/EU can only be said to have
become a significant promoting actor in the last wave, which commenced in
the immediate aftermath of the Cold War (Jensen 2003; K. Smith 2003a;
Youngs 2001).
The fact that the EU has been a relative latecomer to an area of activity
historically shaped primarily by the Americans (Ikenberry 2000; T. Smith
1994) has in several respects hampered both theoretical and empirical inquiry
into its role as an international democracy and rule of law promotion actor.
Since the institutional and intellectual prism within which EU thinking
about democracy promotion originally developed in the post-Cold War era
has primarily been the enlargement of the regional organization itself 
(K. Smith 2003a) – a prism radically different from that of the US, or the
World Bank and the UN for that matter (Jomo and Fine 2006; Newman and
Rich 2004) – the American-dominated democratization literature has long
neglected the European experience. In reality, EU enlargement processes in
the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), and later Turkey and
the Balkans, have been, as Whitehead (2001a, 415) observes: “a major, but
under-theorized, component of the post-cold war drive for ‘democracy
promotion’ in those parts of the world that were until recently not organized
into liberal democratic regimes”, yet even in the case of post-Communist
transformations, as Dimitrova (2002, 174) laments, the enlargement and
democratization literatures have until very recently tended to “not only pass
each other as ships in the night, but they rarely even sail in the same sea”.
Indeed, until the turn of the Millennium, studies on Eastern enlargement
were almost entirely either descriptive or focused on accounting for individ-
ual Member States’ policy preferences, as well as the EU’s collective decision
to assume the risks and costs of expansion (Maresceau 1997; Mayhew 1998;
Henderson 1999; Ott and Inglis 2002).
The dearth of careful attention to the external influence on domestic
change puzzle imbued in pre-accession processes can be explained with refer-
ence not only to the lingering insularity of European studies from broader
questions in comparative politics and international relations theory, but 
to a number of additional factors including: the wider screening out of 
international dimensions from earlier generations of democratization 
scholarship; the incremental and fragmented manner in which EU policies
have developed since the inception of the first pre-accession process in 1994;
the highly technocratic, often cryptic nature of accession negotiations, which
made the topic inhospitable to non-EU experts; and finally, the perception
among scholars of democratization and democracy promotion that the EU’s
sui generis nature as an international actor, as well as the temporally and
spatially limited nature of enlargement, offered few lessons of broader utility
to the field (Magen 2004).
This latter point deserves further elaboration, since the focus on enlarge-
ment as a self-contained phenomenon has also afflicted to a considerable
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extent those scholars who did eventually turn to examine the EU
expansion–democratization nexus of inquiry (Dimitrova 2002; Haughton
2007; Kelley 2004a; Kubicek 2003; Pridham 2005; Sadurski 2004;
Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2004 and 2005a; Vachudova 2005). Although a number of commentators
have pointed out that the dynamics created by EU expansion in the last
decade constitutes a set of conditions as close to a laboratory experiment in
external influence on domestic democratic development as is likely to occur
in social science (Falkner 2000; Pridham 2002), rigorous comparative analy-
sis on the EU expansion–democratization nexus has remained sparse and frag-
mented. Studies in the area typically analyze single enlargement rounds
(Kelley 2004a; Pridham 2005; Vachudova 2005), single country cases, or
single policy areas (Jacoby 2004; Linden 2002; Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2005a). Within this picture, several studies are dedicated to
democracy generally (Kubicek 2003; Pridham 2005; Sadurski, Czarnota and
Krygier 2006) and human rights (Fierro 2003), but the subject of rule of law
has attracted little systematic attention, remaining to a great extent the
‘forgotten Copenhagen Criteria’.10
Moreover, it is now high time for scholars and practitioners alike to look
beyond enlargement and onto a broader canvas of EU engagement strategies
meant to exercise transformative power abroad and in particular to undertake
systematic, comparative studies of enlargement and non-enlargement strate-
gies so as to gain a better understanding of the nature, extent and limitations
of external actor influence. Evidence of what a number of observers variously
describe as “external Europeanization”, “EU external governance”, “transfor-
mative engagement” and “transformative power” (Grabbe 2006; Lavenex
2004; Schimmelfennig and Wagner 2004; Youngs 2005) – all involving the
projection of EU rules, institutions and governance processes to non-member,
non-candidate states and other international organization – can be found glob-
ally (Grugel 2004; Horng 2003; Szymanski and Smith 2005), but the
phenomenon is most pronounced in the European peripheries. Regions
surrounding the EU “attract attention from policy-making institutions of the
EU and, over time, become targets of significant ‘policy export’ from the
Union”. (Christiansen, Petito and Torna 2000, 410).
Indeed, EU efforts to affect transformation in neighboring regions have not
been confined to the hope that the Union’s liberal-democratic example would
somehow infect neighboring regions through some passive form of diffusion
(Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006; Skrede
Glenditsch and Ward 2006). On the contrary, the perception that enlargement
has been the most successful foreign policy instrument the EU has ever
wielded, new security imperatives, path dependence, and turf battles over the
making of EU foreign policy have, over the past several years, prompted EU
actors – notably the Commission and the Council – to adapt the methodolo-
gies used to promote democratization and marketization in the CEECs and
apply these first to the Balkans, and later to Ukraine, the South Caucasus,
North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean (Magen 2006). EU efforts at
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transformative engagement, exercised through bilateral agreements and
regional frameworks – notably the Stabilization and Association Process
(SAP) in the western Balkans, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)
and now the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – involves the establish-
ment and progressive development of formal comprehensive ties incorporating
regularized cooperation, dialogue and monitoring (bolstered by financial
assistance, technical aid and conditionality) on a broad range of subjects
(trade, competition, standards, transport, environment, justice and home
affairs, human rights, democracy and so forth) with the aim of affecting 
far-reaching economic, political and social change in targeted countries.11
As chapter 3 in this volume explains in detail, the incentives deployed by
the EU in an attempt to affect such changes in the CEECs, Turkey, the
Balkans and the ENP countries vary in certain critical respects, and are
comparable in others. Most importantly, the “golden carrot” of full EU
membership credibly present in the case of Romania, has, at different times
over the last decade been less or more uncertain in the case of Turkey. In a
third category, western Balkan countries included in the SAP, such as Serbia,
have since 2000 been made “potential candidates” – offering a more distant
and tenuous prospect of full inclusion – whereas ENP countries, such as
Ukraine, have so far been completely excluded from a membership horizon,
and instead offered the prospect of a still vaguely defined form of partial 
integration into the EU system (Magen 2006).
At the same time, the methodologies used by the EU in an attempt to
affect democratic rule of law development across these different categories of
engagement share common assumptions about modes and instruments of
external influence, creating new opportunities for comparative analysis. In
essence, all four categories are characterized by: (1) a top-down mode of
engagement, focusing on intergovernmental bargaining and bureaucratic
exchange rather than more diffuse, bottom-up support for civil society; 
(2) a legalistic, technocratic approach to reform-promotion, drawing on the
Acquis Communautaire for standards and benchmarks of reform; (3) the use 
of “reinforcement by reward” type of conditionality, rather than punitive
measures or ex ante conditionality;12 (4) regular monitoring and reporting 
on progress in meeting reform benchmarks; (5) financial and technical 
assistance to help fund reforms; and (6) the progressive establishment and
development of ‘socialization forums’ – such as technical committees 
and subcommittees, secondment of bureaucrats in ‘twinning’ programs, and
selective third-country participation in EU programs and agencies.
Table 1.1 shows the possible choices and the actual ones (in bold) by giving
priority in the presentation of criteria to the first one, i.e. the status of rela-
tionships with the EU. In this perspective we may have a prospective member,
when there is already a decision on the accession, a negotiating candidate, when
that decision has still to be made but negotiation has begun, a potential candidate,
when there is no negotiation but there is the possibility of membership, 
a virtual member, when accession is excluded but a set of other integration 
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policies can be carried out, a neighbor country when geographical proximity
may imply stronger relationships of different kinds.13
In our choice of the countries, by going beyond enlargement and examining
the interaction between EU strategies of transformative engagement, on the
one side, and domestic dynamics in Romania, Turkey, Serbia and Ukraine, on
the other, we can derive more general lessons regarding the mechanisms, path-
ways and limitations of international influence on domestic change than would
have been possible where the canvas of inquiry involves candidates alone. What
are our theoretical expectations concerning the scope and depth of potential EU
influence across these different categories of engagement? Where, if at all, do
we find evidence that EU attempts to export its rules, institutions and norms
have had an influence? If we do identify evidence of such influence, where do we
find it and what actually constitutes that “influence”? Where we can trace EU
influence in particular, rather than the involvement of other actors such as
NATO, the Council of Europe, USAID or the World Bank, how does that
influence sit with our theoretical expectations about the variable power of
conditionality, financial and technical aid, and socialization techniques
deployed by the EU in an effort to encourage rule of law reforms across these
different categories of engagement? What confluence of domestic considera-
tions and external mechanisms are more likely to achieve compliance with EU
reform demands? Does influence, where it exists, appear random, or can we
identify clear patterns which can then inform future policy in Europe and
beyond? By posing these questions in relation to both enlargement and non-
enlargement cases, we break away from the self-contained constraints of exist-
ing inquiries into the enlargement–democratization nexus, and seek lessons of
broader interest to scholars and practitioners in the fields of comprehensive
security, democracy and rule of law promotion and development economics.
Useful inquiry into the role, actual and potential, of the EU as an interna-
tional democracy and rule of law promotion actor in its near abroad has also
suffered from generalizations and a dearth of empirical study. Commentators
writing on the effects of European integration on the improvement of democ-
racy in the CEECs, from both the supply and receiving ends of the relation-
ship, have tended to oscillate rather wildly between awe and dismissal.14
Where it has been declared to be found, moreover, EU transformative power
has largely been assumed, rather than demonstrated, and although a number
of recent studies have began to formulate finer-grained hypotheses about
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Table 1.1 Relationships of selected regimes with the EU
Category Countries in category/Case Study
Prospective/new members Bulgaria, Romania
Negotiating candidates Croatia, Turkey
Potential candidates Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia
European neighboring countries Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
Russia, Ukraine
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conditions and modes of influence, as well as trying to locate particular influ-
ences (Haughton 2007; Kelley 2004a; Pridham 2005; Sadurski, Czarnota and
Krygier 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a; Vachudova 2005),
large gaps in knowledge persist over critical questions – where, how and to
what degree has the EU managed to influence rule of law conditions in
enlargement versus non-enlargement countries; through what modes of inter-
action with domestic decision-makers and other constituencies, and with
what consequences?
This study addressed these questions through qualitative empirical analysis,
using structured, focused comparison of case studies (George and Bennett
2005). The method is ‘structured’ in that it identifies a set of questions that
reflect the objectives of the research and then poses these questions to each of
the four case studies under consideration in order to standardize data collec-
tion, thereby making the systematic comparison and cumulation of the find-
ings of the cases possible. The method is ‘focused’ in that it is concerned with
certain aspects of the cases examined (rule of law reforms) within a given
period of time (from 1991 to 2006). These methodological requirements of
structure and focus apply equally to all individual cases under consideration.15
This involved a two-pronged research strategy. First, detailed ‘country
reports’ were compiled on each one of the case study countries. These covered
the long-term domestic economic, historical and political legacies of the
country, constitutional and governmental systems; as well as a host of shorter-
term indicators relating to levels of economic development, political party
constellation and elections, media freedom, civil society, civil liberties and
political rights, state capacity, judicial independence, organized crime, civil-
ian control of the police and armed forces, due process, corruption and gover-
nance. In addition, each country report mapped the country’s international
linkages, both with the EU and other international actors in order to identify
antecedent conditions, as well as domestic and external independent variables.
Second, using a detailed, structured questionnaire we posed a common set of
questions to the case study authors and required that answers to the questions
posed be backed by reliable data – including interviews with officials, official
reports, local media materials and commentary. Using the questionnaire as a
shared analytical framework, allowed case study authors to trace domestic
changes in the five dimensions of rule of law conditions over the applicable
period, and to analyze when and how international factors have impacted such
reforms across the three levels of analysis studied – formal rule adoption, inter-
nalization and implementation. In order to minimize the risk of privileging
EU impact over both domestic variables and other international actors, coun-
try experts were asked to first trace domestic rule of law reforms in the five
dimensions identified, and only then zoom out to examine external influences,
identifying both EU and non-EU influences.
How were the case studies selected in the first place? The first step towards
specific case study selection involved a clear identification of the applicable
universe of cases. This universe was shaped by three broad criteria. First, we
were interested in those states that were subject to some type of EU regional
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transformative engagement strategy (either enlargement or non-enlargement
bound) and who were, by the time the research was launched in 2004, non-EU
Member States (see Table 1).16 The pool of countries falling within this category
covered a total of twenty-five countries: the remaining candidates negotiating
accession (Bulgaria and Romania); the only country that was then officially
recognized as a candidate but with whom accession negotiations were not yet
opened (Turkey); the Western Balkan countries covered by the SAP policy
(Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia);
and the fifteen states (and one non-state entity) covered by the ENP (Algeria,
Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Egypt; Georgia; Israel; Jordan; Lebanon; Libya;
Moldova; Morocco; Syria; Tunisia; Ukraine, and the Palestinian Authority).
Second, whereas recent scholarship has chiefly focused on transition to
democracy (Bunce 2003; McFaul 2004; 2007) or the endurance of authoritar-
ian regimes (Brownlee 2007; Schedler 2006), we were concerned with the
dynamics that facilitate or hinder the transformation of these ambiguous or
minimalist, electoral democracies, into more substantive, higher quality
democracies, with a genuine rule of law. This meant that those countries falling
within the nominal universe of cases but which were either fully consolidated
liberal democracies (Israel) or, more typically, clear non-democracies (Albania,
Algeria, Azerbaijan; Belarus; Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Moldova, Morocco; Syria,
and Tunisia) were excluded from the pool of cases. And thirdly, we avoided cases
of territories lacking full state sovereignty, thus excluding Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Kosovo, and the Palestinian Authority from the pool of cases.
Apart from isolating the explanatory factor it wishes to vary – i.e. relations
with the EU – and carefully defining the relevant universe of cases, the study
controls (to the extent possible in country-level structured, focused compar-
isons) for the key independent variables that may impact rule of law develop-
ment in the domestic systems of the subject countries. The choice of specific
case studies, therefore, was informed by the two main explanatory theories of
democratic development – the actor-based, agency-driven approach, on the
one hand, and the structuralist, socioeconomic approach, on the other hand.
For more than two decades now, the dominant (perhaps even hegemonic)
theoretical approach to explaining the success or failure of democratic transi-
tion and consolidation has emphasized the role of agency, strategic-bargaining
calculation, and institutional power dynamics, particularly among ruling and
opposition elites.  Departing from what they saw as the overly deterministic,
pessimistic bent of modernization and dependency theories in the 1960s and
70s, scholars of the third and fourth ‘waves’ of democratization emphasize the
role of state and societal actors in determining the outcomes of democratic
development (Bermeo 1990; Berins Collier 1999; Fish 1999; McFaul 2002;
Bunce 2003). Most importantly, the presence or absence of meaningful 
political contestation and the party constellation of hybrid regimes, represent
independent variables that could strongly influence domestic dynamics of rule
of law reforms, determine conformance with international norms, and so
should be standardized as far as possible in comparative case study research. 
As Schimmelfennig argues, in a study of the effects of membership incentives
Hybrid regimes 19
9780415451024-Ch01  4/16/08  7:00 PM  Page 19
on compliance with EU demands in Central and Eastern Europe, the most
important factor for successful external influence on domestic policy reforms
is the constellation of political parties (Schimmelfennig 2005a). Medium- to
long-term prospects of what Schimmelfennig calls “international socializa-
tion” with EU norms, not only depend on the incumbent regime but on the
calculations of their major political competitors, and the ability of those
competitors to gain power through elections. In those CEECs where all major
parties are pro-Western and reform-minded (or “liberal party constellation”)
“international socialization has been smooth and has produced stable, consol-
idated democracies”. (Schimmelfennig 2005a: 828). In countries with an
“anti-liberal” constellation of political forces (such as Belarus, Moldova and
Russia), at the other end of the spectrum, attempts at external influence by
liberal international actors will fail. In contrast, all four case study countries
selected for this study fall into a third category of ‘mixed constellation’ –
where the major political parties in the country are split between reform-
oriented and nationalist/communist-authoritarian oriented parties.
Schimmelfennig contends that the “lock-in effects” of EU integration led
nationalist-authoritarian parties in those countries engaged by the EU in the
enlargement process to adapt to the requirements of the West so that member-
ship incentives have been ultimately successful. By examining hybrid regimes
with mixed-party constellations, across different types of EU engagement, this
study helps isolate the explanatory factor we wish to vary.
Secondly, the socioeconomic requisites, or ‘structuralist’ approach, which
dominated theorizing about regime outcomes in the 1960s, has remained
influential throughout the past four decades (and is recently enjoying a degree
of resurgence) essentially views democratization processes as most likely to
take place in countries displaying higher levels of economic and social devel-
opment. Strongly influenced by modernization theory, the notion that there
exists a positive relationship between a society’s level of economic develop-
ment and its likelihood to be a democracy was intuited for millennia, but first
explicitly articulated by Lipset in 1959, and is now one of the few general and
uncontroversial facts to have emerged from the study of democratic develop-
ment processes (Geddes 1999). Higher levels of socioeconomic development
(typically measured by the Human Development Index (HDI)) makes transition
to democracy more likely, helps democracies endure (Przeworski et al. 1996;
Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix and Stokes 2003), and is also associated with
higher levels of civil liberties and political rights as measured by Freedom
House (Rowen 1995). Accordingly, case studies were also selected from among
the universe of cases, based on their similar ranking on the HDI score, to 
standardize levels of socioeconomic development (Table 1.2).
Comparative standardization is also increased by the fact that the study has
opted for case study countries that are relatively large in terms of both
geographical and population size. In order to avoid allegations of ‘cherry
picking’, moreover, the study deliberately focuses on ‘hard cases’, where prob-
lems of legacy – post-communism in Romania, Serbia and Ukrainian, and
religious-nationalist fissures in Serbia and Turkey – entrench anti-liberal
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Table 1.2 Human Development Index (HDI) rankings of case study countries1
Case study country HDI rank 1990 HDI rank 1995 HDI rank 2000 HDI rank 2004
Romania 0.775 0.770 0.778 0.805
Turkey 0.706 0.729 0.747 0.755
Serbia2 – 0.729 (1999) 0.772 (2002) 0.786
Ukraine 0.800 0.748 0.755 0.774
Sources: for 1, see United National Development Program, Human Development Report: http://hdr.
undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/indicators/15.html); for 2 see http://www.undp.org.yu/tareas/reports/details.
cfm?id=91).
Notes:
1 The HDI is a composite index measuring levels of socioeconomic development in a given territory. The
index is a combined score of three indices: (1) Life expectancy at birth; (2) Combined primary, second-
ary and tertiary education, and; (3) Gross Domestic Product per capita (PPP US$). All case study coun-
tries rank in the upper–medium human development countries range.
2 The lack of internationally recognized data collected by the Serbian authorities has meant that the
UNDP has started publishing National Human Development Reports on Serbia, including the calcu-
lation of the HDI, only since 1996, and that figures were published on Serbia in 1999, 2002 and 2004.
Despite the impossibility of guaranteeing the full compatibility of data on Serbia with the general HDI,
the UNDP is confident that a close level of approximation exists between the Serbian human develop-
ment picture and the general index. 
political and bureaucratic actors in the domestic system, posing comparable
challenges to democratic rule of law reforms promoted by a liberal interna-
tional actor.
In order better to understand the political situation of the chosen countries,
some data from the World Bank on the state of rule of law can be recalled in
Table 1.3. If the minus sign means that a country is still in a poor condition as
to rule of law, the situation of the four countries during the last decade is fairly
gloomy. But the notion of rule of law according to the World Bank tries not to
include aspects related to democracy.17 When we include our dimensions of a
democractic rule of law (DRoL) the figures, shown in Table 1.4 result.
Table 1.3 Rule of law in the four countries 1996–2005 (World Bank)
Country 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005
Romania –0.34 –0.35 –0.32 –0.23 –0.22 –0.23 –0.29
Serbia –1.26 –1.06 –1.14 –0.99 –0.97 –0.78 –0.81
Turkey –0.02 –0.01 –0.07 –0.15 +0.02 +0.02 +0.07
Ukraine –0.73 –0.88 –0.80 –0.87 –0.84 –0.83 –0.60
Source: World Bank, A Decade Measuring the Quality of Governance. Governance Matters 2006 Worldwide
Governance Indicators. (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANT COR/ Resources/
17404791150402582357/26booklet_decade _of_measuring_ governance.pdf)
Notes:
The indicator of rule of law adopted by the World Bank refers to “the extent to which agents have confi-
dence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police,
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”. Its range is from –2.5 (worst governance
outcomes) through 2.5 (better governance outcomes). Until the 2006 referendum, Serbia was grouped
together with Montenegro.
9780415451024-Ch01  4/16/08  7:00 PM  Page 21
22 Amichai Magen and Leonardo Morlino
Ta
bl
e 
1.
4
M
ea
su
re
s 
of
 d
em
oc
ra
ti
c 
ru
le
 o
f 
la
w
 i
n 
th
e 
fo
ur
 c
ou
nt
ri
es (A
) 
C
iv
il
 a
nd
 p
ol
it
ic
al
 r
ig
ht
s
C
ou
nt
ry
89
-9
0
90
-9
1
91
-9
2
92
-9
3
93
-9
4
94
-9
5
95
-9
6
96
-9
7
97
-9
8
98
-9
9
99
-0
0
00
-0
1
01
-0
2
02
- 
03
03
-0
4
04
-0
5
05
-0
6
R
om
an
ia
7
5.
5
5
4
4
3.
5
3.
5
2.
5
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2.
5
2
Se
rb
ia
4.
5
4.
5
5.
5
5.
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
4
3
2.
5
2.
5
2.
5
2.
5
Tu
rk
ey
3
3
3
3
3
5
5
4.
5
4.
5
4.
5
4.
5
4.
5
4.
5
3.
5
3.
5
3
3
U
kr
ai
ne
3
3
4
3.
5
3.
5
3.
5
3.
5
3.
5
3.
5
4
4
4
4
3.
5
2.
5
(B
) 
Ju
di
ci
al
 i
nd
ep
en
de
nc
e 
an
d 
ca
pa
ci
ty
C
ou
nt
ry
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
R
om
an
ia
4.
25
4.
25
4.
25
4.
25
4.
25
4.
25
4.
25
4.
00
4.
00
Se
rb
ia
5.
00
5.
75
5.
50
4.
25
4.
25
5.
00
4.
25
4.
25
4.
25
Tu
rk
ey
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
U
kr
ai
ne
3.
75
4.
00
4.
50
4.
50
4.
75
4.
50
4.
75
4.
25
4.
25
(C
) 
In
st
it
ut
io
na
l 
an
d 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
C
ou
nt
ry
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
R
om
an
ia
–0
.8
8
–0
.6
3
–0
.6
7
–0
.3
2
–0
.1
6
–0
.1
1
–0
.0
3
Se
rb
ia
–0
.7
1
–1
.1
1
–0
.0
8
–0
.6
1
–0
.5
0
–0
.1
2
–0
.3
1
Tu
rk
ey
+
0.
10
–0
.0
7
–0
.3
6
–0
.4
5
–0
.2
7
–0
.2
5
+
0.
08
U
kr
ai
ne
–0
.7
9
–0
.9
7
–1
.0
3
–1
.0
1
–0
.9
4
–0
.9
6
–0
.6
3
9780415451024-Ch01  4/16/08  7:00 PM  Page 22
Hybrid regimes 23
(D
) 
R
ef
or
m
 t
o 
co
m
ba
t 
co
rr
up
ti
on
, i
ll
eg
al
it
y 
an
d 
ab
us
e 
of
 p
ow
er
C
ou
nt
ry
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
R
om
an
ia
–0
.8
8
–0
.6
3
–0
.6
7
–0
.3
2
–0
.1
6
–0
.1
1
–0
.0
3
Se
rb
ia
–0
.7
1
–1
.1
1
–0
.0
8
–0
.6
1
–0
.5
0
–0
.1
2
–0
.3
1
Tu
rk
ey
–0
.1
6
–0
.3
8
+
0.
11
–0
.0
5
+
0.
09
+
0.
07
+
0.
27
U
kr
ai
ne
–0
.8
7
–1
.0
0
–0
.7
6
–0
.7
3
–0
.5
8
–0
.6
3
–0
.4
2
(E
) 
P
ol
ic
e 
re
fo
rm
 a
nd
 c
iv
il
ia
n 
co
nt
ro
l 
ov
er
 m
il
it
ar
y
C
ou
nt
ry
Tr
en
d 
20
01
–0
6
R
om
an
ia
6
Se
rb
ia
6
Tu
rk
ey
6
U
kr
ai
ne
6
So
ur
ce
s:
 T
he
y 
ar
e 
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
: 
fo
r 
(A
) 
F
re
ed
om
 i
n 
th
e 
W
or
ld
; 
fo
r 
(B
) 
F
re
ed
om
 H
ou
se
 N
at
io
n 
in
 T
ra
ns
it
; 
fo
r 
(C
) 
an
d 
(D
), 
W
or
ld
 B
an
k,
 A
 D
ec
ad
e 
M
ea
su
ri
ng
 t
he
 Q
ua
li
ty
 o
f 
G
ov
er
na
nc
e.
G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
M
at
te
rs
 2
00
6.
 W
or
ld
w
id
e 
G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
In
di
ca
to
rs
; f
or
 (
E
), 
B
er
te
ls
m
an
n 
Tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n 
In
de
x 
20
06
. P
ol
it
ic
al
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
in
 I
nt
er
na
ti
on
al
 C
om
pa
ri
so
n.
N
ot
es
:
Fo
r 
(A
) 
th
e 
ra
ti
ng
s 
ar
e 
ba
se
d 
on
 a
 s
ca
le
 o
f 
1 
to
 7
, w
it
h 
1 
re
pr
es
en
ti
ng
 t
he
 h
ig
he
st
 l
ev
el
 o
f 
de
m
oc
ra
ti
c 
pr
og
re
ss
 a
nd
 7
 t
he
 l
ow
es
t.
 F
or
 (
B
) 
th
e 
se
t 
of
 i
nd
ic
at
or
s 
ar
e:
 1
. h
ig
hl
ig
ht
s
co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
 r
ef
or
m
, 2
. h
um
an
 r
ig
ht
s 
pr
ot
ec
ti
on
s,
 3
. c
ri
m
in
al
 c
od
e 
re
fo
rm
, 4
. j
ud
ic
ia
l 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
, 5
. t
he
 s
ta
tu
s 
of
 e
th
ni
c 
m
in
or
it
y 
ri
gh
ts
, 6
. g
ua
ra
nt
ee
s 
of
 e
qu
al
it
y
be
fo
re
 t
he
la
w
 7
. t
re
at
m
en
t 
of
 s
us
pe
ct
s 
an
d 
pr
is
on
er
s,
 a
nd
 8
. c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
it
h 
ju
di
ci
al
 d
ec
is
io
ns
. F
or
 (C
) “
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s”
 is
 c
om
po
se
d 
of
 4
 s
pe
ci
fi
c 
di
m
en
si
on
s:
 1
. t
he
 q
ua
li
ty
 o
f
pu
bl
ic
 s
er
vi
ce
s,
 2
. 
th
e 
qu
al
it
y 
of
 t
he
 c
iv
il
 s
er
vi
ce
 a
nd
 i
ts
 d
eg
re
e 
of
 i
nd
ep
en
de
nc
e 
fr
om
 p
ol
it
ic
al
 p
re
ss
ur
es
, 
3.
 t
he
 q
ua
li
ty
 o
f 
po
li
cy
 f
or
m
ul
at
io
n 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 a
nd
 4
. 
th
e
cr
ed
ib
il
it
y 
of
 t
he
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t’s
 c
om
m
it
m
en
t 
to
 s
uc
h 
po
li
ci
es
. F
or
 t
he
 r
an
ge
 s
ee
 T
ab
le
 1
. F
or
 (D
) “
C
on
tr
ol
 o
f C
or
ru
pt
io
n”
 r
ef
er
s 
to
 “
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 t
o 
w
hi
ch
 p
ub
li
c 
po
w
er
 is
 e
xe
rc
is
ed
fo
r 
pr
iv
at
e 
ga
in
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 b
ot
h 
pe
tt
y 
an
d 
gr
an
d 
fo
rm
s 
of
 c
or
ru
pt
io
n,
 a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
“c
ap
tu
re
” 
of
 t
he
 s
ta
te
 b
y 
el
it
es
 a
nd
 p
ri
va
te
 in
te
re
st
s”
. F
or
 t
he
 r
an
ge
 s
ee
 T
ab
le
 1
. F
or
 (E
) t
he
 in
di
-
ca
to
r 
is
 “
P
en
al
ti
es
 f
or
 a
bu
se
 o
f 
po
w
er
 “
 a
nd
 t
he
 r
el
at
ed
 q
ue
st
io
n 
is
: 
“a
re
 t
he
re
 l
eg
al
 o
r 
po
li
ti
ca
l 
pe
na
lt
ie
s 
fo
r 
of
fi
ce
ho
ld
er
s 
w
ho
 a
bu
se
 t
he
ir
 p
os
it
io
n?
”.
 T
he
 r
at
in
g 
is
: 
0-
w
or
st
ou
tc
om
e 
in
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
in
g 
pe
na
lt
ie
s 
fo
r 
ab
us
e 
of
 p
ow
er
; 1
0-
be
st
 o
ut
co
m
e 
in
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
in
g 
pe
na
lt
ie
s 
fo
r 
ab
us
e 
of
 p
ow
er
.
9780415451024-Ch01  4/16/08  7:00 PM  Page 23
24 Amichai Magen and Leonardo Morlino
While these available data can give some sense of the existing situation in
the four countries along our definition of DRoL, there are at least two evident
problems. The first is the heterogeneity of the sources – here, Freedom
House, World Bank and Bertelsmann Transformation Index – and the differ-
ent spans of time we have data for. But for us there is a much more relevant
problem: what those figures actually say. To understand something that helps
us to reply to the research questions addressed above, we need to go in depth
into the qualitative analysis of those five dimensions in the four countries.
But to do that we need to review and assess the existing hypotheses in the
literature and then to develop a theoretical framework for the empirical
analysis. The next chapter is devoted to this task, before the analysis of what
have been the policies of the EU in terms of DRoL vis-à-vis those four coun-
tries (see Chapter 3), and the subsequent discussion of what has happened
inside the countries (see Chapters 4–7).
Notes
1 See Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World’ surveys (available at: http://www.
freedomhouse.org). 
2 The identification of the attributes of the Rule of law has always been a contested issue.
Indeed, because the conceptualization of the Rule of law is inherently linked with theory of
the Rule of law (itself an open, evolving concept) there is no point in arguing about ‘the
correct’ definition. We therefore follow the sage advice of Gerardo Munck and Jay
Verkuilen not to insist that there exists one correct definition of a concept, but to avoid the
extremes of including too little or too much in a definition relative to our theoretical goals
(see Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 7–9).
3 In fact, the term is contested along several axes. Linguistically, the term ‘rule of law’ is often
equated with the concepts of l’Etat de droit, in the French legal tradition, Rechtstaatlichkeit
or Rechtstaat, in the Germanic legal tradition, and Estado de derecho, in the Spanish and
Portuguese traditions, including in Latin America. However, the concepts are not synony-
mous. Grote (1999) concludes that the term belongs to the category of open-ended concepts
which are subject to permanent debate. Substantively, too, the concept of the Rule of law
has been subjected to liberal, feminist, socialist critiques. See: Sypnowich (1999); Horwitz
(1977). It has also been subjected to claims that it is impossible to achieve (see: Endicott
(1999); Hutchinson and Monahan (1987); McCormick (1999). We do not contend with
these various critiques here, since we essentially agree with Peerenboom’s point that the fact
that there is room for debate about the proper interpretation of the term “should not blind us to
the broad consensus of its core meaning and basic elements” (Peerenboom 2002, 472).
4 See Ungar (1976), who argues for a strong affinity between liberal market reforms and the
rule of law, and McAuslan (1997). But see also the social-democratic defence of the Rule of
law in Scheuerman (1994).
5 Nonet and Selznick (1978) used the term “autonomous law” to denote the idea of law in
modern legal culture, which is distinguished from “repressive law”.  
6 The development of those five aspects involves the achievement to different extents of:  the
equal enforcement of the law toward everyone, including all state officials; the implemen-
tation of the principle that no one is above the law; the supremacy of legal state through-
out the country, leaving no areas dominated by organized crime, local oligarchs, or political
bosses who are above the law; the minimization of corruption, and where it does exist, its
detection and punishment in the political, administrative, and judicial branches of the
state; the development of efficiency and competency of a state bureaucracy at all levels that
9780415451024-Ch01  4/16/08  7:00 PM  Page 24
Hybrid regimes 25
applies the laws and assumes responsibility in the event of an error; the achievement of a
professional and efficient police force that is respectful of individuals’ legally guaranteed
rights and freedoms, including rights of due process; the equal and unhindered access of
citizens to the justice system to defend their rights and to contest law suits between private
citizens or between private citizens and public institutions; the hearing and expeditious
solution of criminal cases and civil and administrative lawsuits; the independence of 
the  judiciary at all levels from any political influence; the respect for and enforcement of
rulings of the courts by other agencies of the state; the supremacy of a constitution that is
interpreted and defended by a Constitutional Court.
7 In the conclusions of their well-known seminal study, for example, O’Donnell and
Schmitter (1986, 5) asserted that: “[O]ne of the firmest conclusions that emerged ... was
that transitions from authoritarian rule and immediate prospects for political democracy
were largely to be explained in terms of national forces and calculations. External actors
tended to play an indirect and usually marginal role ....”
8 For a detailed discussion of the divide see Moravcsik (1993, 5–9); Yilmaz (2002). For the
divide between international relations theory and international law see Slaughter,
Tulumello and Wood (1998).
9 Leading examples include: T. Smith (1994); Carothers (1999 and 2000); Cox, Ikenberry
and Inoguchi (2000); Youngs (2001 and 2004).
10 A partial exception is found in Sadurski, Czarnova and Krygier (2006), which contains
several papers relating to the influence of EU enlargement on constitutional and judicial
systems in several post-Communist countries.  
11 For a detailed discussion of the origin and evolution of these strategies, as well as the
instruments deployed by the EU to facilitate rule transfer and internalization, see Ott and
Inglis (2002); Grabbe, (2002); Phinnemore (2003); Magen (2007), Hillion (2000); Adler
and Crawford (2004); Hilpold (2002).
12 This involves granting tangible benefits ex post where the targeted government complies
with the conditions, and withholding the benefits where it does not. See  Schimmelfennig,
Engert and Knobel (2003, esp. 496).
13 See ch. 3 for the main features that characterize the different status of each country vis-à-
vis the European Union. 
14 Whitehead (2001, 19), for instance, asserted that the pre-accession process: “generates
powerful, broad-based, and long-term support for the establishment of democratic 
institutions because it is irreversible, and sets in train a cumulative process of economic
and political integration that offers incentives and reassurances to a very wide array of
social forces. In other words it sets in motion a very complex and profound set of mutual
adjustment processes, both within the incipient democracy and in its interactions with 
the rest of the Community, nearly all of which tends to favour democratic consolidation.”.
A different, though similarly general and positive, view is presented by Schmitter (1995,
524), who argues that: “more than any other international commitment, full EU member-
ship has served to stabilize both political and economic expectations. It does not directly
guarantee the consolidation of democracy; it indirectly makes it easier for national actors
to agree within a narrower range of rules and practices.”. For a similarly sanguine view
from the CEECs see Pehe (2004). For examples of negative views see Kochenov (2007) and
Raik (2004).    
15 On structured, focused comparisons see George and Bennett (2005, 67–72). 
16 This criteria excluded those Central and Eastern European Countries that became full EU
Member States on 1 May 2004 (The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) as well as Cyprus and Malta.
17 Whether this is possible or not is a different issue. See Hiil (2007) for a position in favor
of a definition of ‘a democratic’ Rule of law. Here we contend that today in these coun-
tries is empirically impossible to disentangle Rule of law from aspects such as civil rights
and some political rights. In fact for our purposes we proposed to consider and analyze a
democratic Rule-of-law.
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